Why does countercyclical monetary policy matter? by Satyajit Chatterjee










Such countercyclical monetary policy
is one example of a stabilization policy.
Other examples of U.S. stabilization
policies include the federal insurance
of bank deposits (and the concomitant
supervision and regulation of banking)
and income-maintenance programs,
such as unemployment insurance.
Macroeconomists have
devoted much effort to understanding
how countercyclical monetary policy
affects the volatility of the unemploy-
ment and inflation rates. In contrast,
macroeconomists have directed much
less effort to understanding why
countercyclical monetary policy is
beneficial. This neglect reflects the
fact that, until recently, macro-
economists of very different persua-
sions agreed that policies aimed at
reducing the volatility of unemploy-
ment and inflation are desirable. Of
course, economists disagreed about
what form those policies should take,
but no one questioned the premise
that a less volatile macroeconomic
environment was a desirable policy
goal.
That is no longer the case.
During the last dozen years or so, an
influential minority of macroecono-
mists has questioned the supposed
benefits of reducing volatility and, by
implication, the supposed benefits of
odern capitalistic economies use stabili-
zation policies to minimize fluctuations in
the unemployment and inflation rates. In
the United States, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) lowers the target interest rate for
interbank loans as economic activity slows or when
a financial crisis looms (as in the fall of 1998) and
raises it when inflation threatens to accelerate (as
in late 1999 and early 2000).
countercyclical monetary policy.
The source of this develop-
ment is the same as that which
underlies most major developments in
macroeconomics in the last half-
century, namely, the desire to ground
macroeconomics in sound theoretical
foundations. As in the other sciences,
“sound theoretical foundations” means
explaining macro-level phenomena in
terms of micro-level phenomena; for
example, using theories of household
and business behavior to explain the
behavior of, say, aggregate consumer
spending or aggregate business
investment.
The desire for micro-
foundations also means that macro-
level policies (such as countercyclical
monetary policy) need to be justified in
terms of micro-level effects — how
such policies ultimately benefit
households. Surprisingly, the link
between less macroeconomic volatility
and improved household well-being
has proven weaker than many
macroeconomists might have sup-
posed.
Concerns about the benefits
of countercyclical monetary policy
(and of stabilization policies in
general) are obviously of great impor-
tance to the Federal Reserve System.
My purpose in this article is to
accomplish two tasks: to state clearly
the mainstream view of the supposed
benefits of countercyclical monetary
policy and the challenge posed to it by
recent microfoundations-oriented
research; and to consider how this
challenge may alter our views about
the benefits of countercyclical mon-
etary policy.
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1 Some textbooks call this theory the New
Keynesian or IS-LM approach to macroeconom-
ics. But labels can be misleading; for instance,
Bradford De Long calls the same theory a
subspecies of monetarism. To avoid confusion I
call it the “mainstream view” because it is the
view that characterizes a broad swath of
academic macroeconomics and virtually all of
policy-oriented macroeconomics.
A PRIMER ON MAINSTREAM
MACROECONOMICS AND
ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Let’s begin with a brief
account of how mainstream macroeco-
nomics makes sense of countercyclical
monetary policy.1 In the mainstream
view, the actual unemployment rate
can deviate from the natural, or long-
term, unemployment rate. This natural
rate is determined by factors that
change slowly, such as demographics,
technology, laws and regulations, and
social mores. Because markets don’t
work perfectly, there can be extended
periods when the actual unemploy-
ment rate exceeds the natural rate.
During such times, mainstream
macroeconomic theory predicts that
the inflation rate will fall because
aggregate demand for goods and
services will tend to fall short of
aggregate supply. At other times, the
unemployment rate can fall below the
natural rate, and during those times,
theory predicts that the inflation rate
will rise because aggregate demand will
tend to exceed aggregate supply. Ac-
cording to mainstream macroeconom-
ics, business cycles are a manifestation
of these deviations between the actual
and natural unemployment rates.
This mainstream view of
business cycles provides the rationale
for countercyclical monetary policy.
Suppose that the monetary authority
uses monetary policy to eliminate the
gap between the actual and the natural
unemployment rates. In practice, the
monetary authority would lower short-
term interest rates whenever the
actual unemployment rate threatened
to exceed the natural rate and raise
them whenever the opposite hap-
pened. If this policy were successful,
the actual unemployment rate would
track the natural unemployment rate
closely. Since the natural unemploy-
able; it can only be inferred from long-
term trends in the economy. Thus,
policymakers will sometimes judge a
change in the unemployment rate to
be a deviation from the natural rate
when, in fact, it reflects a change in
the natural rate itself, or vice versa. In
such situations, countercyclical
monetary policy will make the inflation
rate more volatile, not less. For
instance, a persistent attempt to
reverse a decrease in the natural
unemployment rate will lead to
deflation, and a persistent attempt to
reverse an increase in the natural
unemployment rate will lead to
inflation — both of which reduce
public well-being. Thus, misper-
ceptions concerning the natural rate
may lead to policy errors.
Third, mainstream macroeco-
nomics recognizes that the effects of
monetary policy actions are felt with
long and variable lags. Uncertainty
about the length of time it takes for
policy to have an effect on the
economy is another potential source of
policy errors.
STANDARD OF LIVING AS A
CRITERION FOR EVALUATING
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
The fact that countercyclical
monetary policy has both benefits and
costs suggests that it’s important to
find out whether the benefits exceed
the costs to determine if such policies
are worth pursuing. University of
Chicago economist and Nobel laureate
Robert E. Lucas, Jr. was the first to
explore this issue in the context of the
U.S. economy. Lucas observed that
cyclical volatility in the unemployment
and inflation rates per se is not
important to people. What really
matters is the resulting cyclical
volatility in people’s standards of
living. Since consumer spending is one
of the most commonly used indexes of
living standards, Lucas posed the
question: “How much would an
“How much would an
average person in the




Robert E. Lucas, Jr.
ment rate changes only gradually over
time, the result would be a less volatile
actual unemployment rate. Without
persistent gaps between the actual and
natural unemployment rates, the
inflation rate would also be less
volatile. Generally speaking, house-
holds and businesses do not care for
volatility in the unemployment rate or
inflation rate, so such a policy would
enhance public well-being.
However, the mainstream
view acknowledges some important
limits on the scope of countercyclical
monetary policy. First, countercyclical
monetary policy cannot change the
level of the natural unemployment rate
directly. As noted earlier, the natural
unemployment rate is determined by
factors such as technology, demograph-
ics, laws and regulations, and social
mores. Effective countercyclical
monetary policy may provide an
environment that is conducive to
innovation (and therefore the advance
of technology), but it does not have a
direct effect on the natural unemploy-
ment rate.
Second, the natural unem-
ployment rate is not directly observ-  Business Review  Q2 2001   9 www.phil.frb.org
average person in the U.S. pay to avoid
all cyclical volatility in aggregate U.S.
consumer spending?” From the perspec-
tive of mainstream macroeconomics, an
answer to this question provides an
estimate of the maximum potential
benefit from the Fed’s pursuit of
countercyclical monetary policy.2
As one would expect, the
answer depends on how much
households dislike random fluctuations
in their standard of living (i.e., on their
degree of risk aversion), and Lucas
experimented with a variety of
estimates, some more plausible than
others. What he found was that a
person would be willing to pay rather
small amounts to avoid all fluctuations
in the aggregate standard of living.
One estimate, based on a plausible
amount of risk aversion, implies that a
person would pay no more than $23
per year for such a benefit! Such a
paltry sum makes it hard to build a
case for countercyclical monetary
policy.
Of course, Lucas’s finding
that cyclical volatility is not very
painful was (and remains) controver-
sial. For one thing, economists were
quick to note that the degree of risk
aversion can be judged in a variety of
ways, and some of these alternative
ways suggest that the gains from
eliminating all cyclical volatility in
consumer spending are several
hundred-fold larger than Lucas
estimated. Also, as Lucas himself
noted, his calculations assumed that all
households share the burden of
business cycles equally. In reality, the
burden falls disproportionately on
people who become unemployed
during recessions. Taking this fact into
account is likely to raise estimates of
the maximum potential benefit of
countercyclical monetary policy.
However, such criticisms miss
a deeper point: Lucas’s insistence that
the benefits of countercyclical mon-
etary policy be judged from the effect
such policies have on the welfare of
individual households. As he put it:
“[A]n economic system is a collection
of people and serious evaluation of
economic policy involves tracing the
consequences of policies back to the
welfare of the individuals they affect.”
This quote succinctly expresses one of
the core principles of microfounda-
tions-oriented research: volatility in
household in two ways: the probability
of job loss for employed members and
the probability of job gain for unem-
ployed members. For instance, during a
recession, when the unemployment
rate is relatively high, the probability of
job loss for employed workers is also
relatively high, and the probability of
job gain for unemployed individuals is
relatively low. Thus, all individuals
face a higher risk of lost earnings.
Conversely, during an economic
expansion, the probability of job loss
for employed workers is relatively low,
and the probability of job gain for
unemployed workers is relatively high.
Thus, all individuals face a lower risk
of lost earnings. If countercyclical
monetary policy successfully keeps the
unemployment rate equal to the
2 The answer provides only an estimate of the
maximum potential benefit for two reasons.
First, it ignores the costs of policy errors.
Second, it ignores the fact that some portion of
the volatility in consumer spending should be
excluded from the benefit calculation because it
stems from fluctuations in the natural
unemployment rate and cannot be eliminated
by countercyclical monetary policy.
the unemployment and inflation rates
should concern policymakers only if it
results in unacceptable volatility in the
standard of living. As I explain in the
remainder of this article, evaluating
policies based on the standard of living
has surprising implications for the






Let’s examine how reducing
the volatility of the unemployment
rate affects the volatility of consumer
spending. Fluctuations in the unem-
ployment rate affect members of a
“An economic system is a collection of people
and serious evaluation of economic policy
involves tracing the consequences of policies
back to the welfare of the individuals they
affect.”
Robert E. Lucas, Jr.
natural rate over time, the probability
of job loss for employed individuals and
the probability of job gain for unem-
ployed individuals would be less
variable. So an effective counter-
cyclical monetary policy reduces the
volatility of household earnings by
reducing fluctuations in the risk of
unemployment.
How does a reduction in the
volatility of earnings affect fluctuations
in a household’s standard of living?
Suppose that a household always
spends the full amount of its monthly
earnings and does not borrow or save.
In this case, fluctuations in consumer
spending will exactly match fluctua-
tions in household earnings, and a
policy-induced reduction in the10   Q2 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
volatility of household earnings will have
a direct and equal effect on the
volatility of consumer spending.
But what if households save
or borrow? Then, consumer spending
may not fluctuate as much as earnings.
If a member of the household becomes
temporarily unemployed, the house-
hold may draw on a pool of savings
(built up over the years for such an
eventuality) to protect its standard of
living. So, consumer spending will not
fall as much as earnings. When the
member regains employment, house-
hold spending will not rise as much as
earnings because a portion of the
earnings will be used to replenish the
savings drawn down during unemploy-
ment. Building up and maintaining a
stock of savings to protect oneself from
temporary spells of unemployment or
unanticipated expenses is called self-
insurance.3
A surprising implication of
self-insurance is that it weakens the
ability of countercyclical monetary
policy to improve public well-being
because, from a household’s point of
view, self-insurance is a partial substi-
tute for countercyclical monetary
policy. To see this, suppose the
monetary authority introduces a new
countercyclical policy that lowers the
volatility of household earnings. Faced
with lower volatility of earnings, a
household will have an incentive to
lower its stock of savings. Recall that
these savings were accumulated, in
part, to protect living standards from
shortfalls in earnings; however, lower
earnings volatility means that such
situations arise less often.
Thus, improved counter-
cyclical policy will have two effects: it
will reduce the volatility of a
household’s earnings, and it will
induce households to reduce the savings
built up to protect against such volatility.
These two effects have opposing
consequences for the volatility of
consumer spending.  The first effect
lowers the volatility of consumer
spending while the second raises it.4
What will the combined
effect be? Theory predicts that the first
effect will dominate and the volatility
of consumer spending will decline.
But theory also suggests that this
decline will be minor. In other words,
private stocks of savings are a partial
substitute for the beneficial effects of
countercyclical policies: an improved
countercyclical policy partly substitutes
for actions that a household takes to
deal with the ill effects of earnings
volatility.5
The significance of self-
insurance for assessing the benefits of
countercyclical policy was first
recognized in an article published in
1989 by Ayse Imrohoroglu. Imro-
horoglu simulated an economy in
which individuals could borrow and
save to protect their living standards in
the face of temporary spells of unem-
ployment. Her simulations showed
that even if countercyclical policies
made the unemployment rate constant
and ensured that each individual faced
a constant (rather than fluctuating)
probability of job loss, the gain in well-
being would be around $69 per person
per year.6 Although larger than Lucas’s
estimate, the gain was still quite
small.7 As Imrohoroglu noted in her
article, her findings reflected the fact
that individuals in her artificial
economy self-insured themselves pretty
well against temporary spells of
unemployment. As a result, although
effective countercyclical policy did
reduce the volatility of consumer
spending, the resulting gain in well-
being was minor.8
What about volatility in the
inflation rate? From a household’s
point of view, inflation volatility could
be important because it affects the
volatility of the real return on financial
assets, the assets that households use
to self-insure against temporary loss of
earnings. If the expected real return on
these assets is poor, it will blunt the
3 Building up savings includes the case of paying
off debt to keep open the option of borrowing
more in the future.
4 It will raise the volatility of spending because,
all else remaining the same, a lower stock of
savings means that a household is less able to
protect living standards in case of a loss in
earnings.
5 That being said, it’s important to recognize
that some households may not be in a position
to self-insure. For instance, a poor household
living hand-to-mouth is not going to be able to
self-insure and will benefit substantially from a
less volatile macroeconomic environment. But
such households do not constitute the majority.
Furthermore, there are social programs in place
that attempt to deal directly with the many
causes and consequences of poverty. Given
these programs, the appropriate goal of
monetary policy is to concentrate on improving
the well-being of the typical household.
6 Even if countercyclical monetary policy
manages to keep the unemployment rate
constant, an individual’s earnings may still
fluctuate over time because of the possibility
that an individual may lose his or her job. Thus,
even when monetary policy is perfect,
households have to self-insure against temporary
spells of unemployment.
7 In her article, Imrohoroglu presented results
from several different simulations. The result
reported here is for the simulation where
individuals borrow at an annual real interest
rate of 8 percent and save at a real interest rate
of 0 percent. Like Lucas’s, Imrohoroglu’s
calculations provide an estimate of the
maximum potential benefit from countercyclical
monetary policy. She ignores the potential costs
of countercyclical monetary policy, and she
assumes that a fully effective countercyclical
policy corresponds to no fluctuations in the
unemployment rate.
8 Improved countercyclical policy permits
households to lower savings. The additional
one-time increase in consumer spending
permitted by the decline in savings is another
benefit of improved countercyclical policy. But a
one-time increase in consumer spending cannot
permanently improve well-being. For permanent
improvements, one must look at how improved
countercyclical policy affects the volatility of
consumer spending. But that effect, as already
noted, is minor.  Business Review  Q2 2001   11 www.phil.frb.org
incentive to self-insure.  In a sequel to
her first article, Ayse Imrohoroglu and
Edward Prescott used simulation
techniques to investigate the impact of
inflation volatility on public well-being.
Assuming that fluctuations in the
expected inflation rate led to opposite
fluctuations in the expected real return
on assets, they found that inflation
volatility had virtually no adverse
effect on well-being.9 As they noted in
their article, what mattered most to
people in their model was the average
expected real return on financial
assets, not the volatility of the ex-
pected real return.
In short, both theory and
simulation results suggest that self-
insurance acts as a partial substitute
for effective countercyclical policies.
Households can protect their standard
of living from temporarily low earnings
by drawing on a pool of savings built
up for such eventualities.  If they do
not have savings, they can borrow,
then repay the debt when earnings go
back to normal. In such a situation,
improvements in countercyclical
policy partly substitute for private
actions that people take to contain
volatility in their standard of living.
Consequently, the net effect on public
well-being is not as large as one might
otherwise suppose.
Of course, the decline in
household income due to loss of
employment is often mitigated by state
unemployment insurance programs and
by the progressive nature of the federal
tax code (tax liabilities fall faster than
earned income). From a household’s
perspective, self-insurance is also a
substitute for social insurance programs
and so raises troubling questions about
the net benefits of these programs as
well. However, Ayse Imrohoroglu and
Gary Hansen have shown that even if
households self-insure, unemployment
insurance programs are generally quite
beneficial, at least as long as the
programs don’t adversely affect people’s
desire to seek work.
should probably be greater” (Touche
Ross, 1989, p.10). Perhaps because of this
commonsense aspect, surveys of
household finances show that saving
for emergencies is the most important
reason cited for saving. These surveys
also find that a household’s stock of
financial wealth is very volatile, even
over short periods. Furthermore,
studies show that households that face
greater uncertainty about earnings
tend to accumulate more financial
wealth.
All these findings are
consistent with households’ using
financial wealth as a buffer against
random shocks to income and ex-
penses. In addition, self-insurance
accounts for several puzzling patterns
in consumer spending. It would take us
too far afield to discuss all of these
here, but one is worth mentioning.
Researchers have known for some time
that a typical household does not begin
to save for retirement until fairly late
in life. This late start in providing for
retirement has puzzled economists
because it seems inconsistent with
forward-looking behavior. However,
simulations have now shown that self-
insurance may dominate other motives
for saving until an individual reaches
his or her late 40s. It’s only in late
middle age that retirement-related
considerations surface as the main
determinant of savings behavior. Thus,
self-insurance may go a long way
toward accounting for the puzzling
delay in providing for retirement.11
From a theoretical point of
view, self-insurance is a basic outcome
of forward-looking behavior, and the
idea played a key role in Milton
In short, both theory
and simulation results
suggest that self-




Before we take the policy
implications of self-insurance seriously
we must ask if, theory and simulations
aside, households really do self-insure.
Fortunately, a body of evidence now
speaks to that question.10 First, self-
insurance accords with common sense.
For instance, one financial planning
guide recommends that households
accumulate a stock of savings to deal
with uncertainty: “It is generally held
that your liquid assets should roughly
equal four to six months’ employment
income. If you are in an unstable
employment situation…the amount
9 The real return on financial assets depends on
the difference between the yield (or interest
rate) on these assets and the inflation rate.
According to mainstream macroeconomics, the
real return on financial assets is countercyclical.
The yield on financial assets does not rise as
much as the inflation rate when the unemploy-
ment rate falls below the natural rate, and it
does not fall as much as the inflation rate when
the unemployment rate rises above the natural
rate. The article by Imrohoroglu and Prescott
examined the extreme case in which the
interest rate on financial assets stayed constant,
so that any change in the expected inflation rate
led to an equal and opposite change in the
expected real return.
10 This discussion draws heavily on Christopher
Carroll’s 1997 article on the subject.
11 This result emerges because self-insurance
requires that households save in safe financial
assets, the return on which is usually low. The
low return discourages saving for retirement
until late middle age.12   Q2 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Friedman’s Nobel Prize-winning work
on the theory of consumer spending.12
It’s remarkable that although macro-
economists have been aware of self-
insurance since the 1950s, its signifi-
cance for countercyclical monetary
policy remained unappreciated until
the late 1980s. In all likelihood, the
reason for this lies in the fact that for a
long time, the criteria for evaluating
countercyclical policies made no direct
reference to living standards. When
Lucas insisted that macroeconomists
use living standards as a criterion for
policy evaluation, the significance of
self-insurance quickly became appar-
ent.




about the goals of countercyclical
monetary policy as conceived by
mainstream macroeconomics. Since
households can self-insure against the
adverse effects of earnings and
inflation volatility, and the evidence
suggests that they do, policy-induced
reductions in earnings and inflation
volatility are predicted to yield only a
minor improvement in public well-
being. One could conclude from these
findings that improving countercyclical
monetary policy is not worth the cost;
monetary authorities should de-
emphasize reducing volatility and
concentrate on other monetary policy
goals, such as maintaining a low rate of
inflation. However, such a conclusion
overlooks a potentially devastating
side-effect of self-insurance: unbridled
self-insurance can be a source of
macroeconomic instability. A simple
example illustrates how this can
happen.
Imagine a small community
served by a single bank. The bank
accepts deposits from local households
and uses those deposits to make loans
to local businesses. Imagine also that
there is no federal insurance of bank
deposits or unemployment insurance.
A bank deposit is one financial asset
that households use to self-insure
themselves; another is cash. Under
normal circumstances, a bank deposit
is the preferred financial asset for self-
insurance, since it accrues interest and
cash does not.
Now imagine that some
shock adversely affects many busi-
nesses in this community. Some
businesses close; some people become
unemployed; and those that still have
jobs face a higher probability of job
loss. The logic of self-insurance says
that the employed will increase their
savings to offset the heightened
probability of job loss. As households
reduce their spending, businesses in
the community will experience a
further fall in sales. The decline in
sales will send more firms out of
business, causing more unemployment
and making households even more
eager to self-insure.
If business failures continue,
households will begin to think that the
next business to fail will be the bank,
and they’ll rush to convert their
savings into cash. The bank may well
be sound, but the large-scale with-
drawals of deposits will cause it to fail.
The bank failure will deprive local
businesses of a source of credit and,
thus, force even more businesses to
close. This cycle of falling demand,
rising unemployment, more hoarding,
and further decline in demand is an
economic crisis. The sequence of events
in this hypothetical community can,
and does, happen on a larger scale.
Indeed, it’s what happened to many
U.S. communities during the Great
Depression.
This example highlights the
point that actions that are beneficial
from an individual’s point of view can
be self-defeating when taken simulta-
neously by many. The effect of a single
household’s increasing its savings to
self-insure against a heightened
possibility of job loss is quite different
from the effects of all households doing
the same. A simultaneous increase in
the desire to self-insure may be self-
defeating because it can make the
event against which insurance is
sought more probable. John Maynard
Keynes observed long ago that an
economy in which saving and invest-
ment decisions are carried out by
different sets of people is susceptible to
the paradox of thrift: if all individuals
attempt to save more cash (so that the
additional savings do not lead to a
corresponding increase in business
investment), aggregate demand will
fall and so will income and savings.13
Once we recognize that a
simultaneous increase in the desire to
self-insure could destabilize the
economy, the current U.S. policy
arrangement begins to make more
sense: self-insurance is only part of the
solution to reducing earnings volatility.
Some of the burden of providing
insurance against loss of earnings is
borne by the government through the
other two prominent stabilization
policies mentioned in the introduc-
tion: federal insurance of bank deposits
and state-run unemployment insur-
ance programs. Deposit insurance
eliminates the need for households to
12 The idea also attracted the attention of
economic theorists, most notably Truman
Bewley of Yale University.  In a series of articles
published in the 1970s, Bewley provided a wide-
ranging discussion of the implications of self-
insurance. More recently, macroeconomists
have picked up where the theorists left off.
Influential articles by macroeconomists include
those by Mark Hugget and S. Rao Aiyagari.
13 The possibility that individually rational
actions can have bad social consequences is a
recurring theme in economics. For a wide-
ranging and very readable discussion of this
theme, see Thomas Schelling’s book.  Business Review  Q2 2001   13 www.phil.frb.org
self-insure in the form of cash, and
unemployment insurance permits
households to face a higher probability
of job loss with greater equanimity.
Both programs attenuate the poten-
tially destabilizing effects of house-
holds’ response to heightened eco-
nomic insecurity.
The benefit of countercyclical
monetary policy can also be under-
stood in these terms. By attempting to
reduce the volatility of the unemployment
rate, countercyclical monetary policy
makes it less likely that households will
face a large simultaneous increase in the
probability of job loss. In other words,
countercyclical monetary policy helps
to nip the problem of macroeconomic
instability in the bud. One might think
that with two other stabilization
policies in place, it’s unnecessary for
monetary policy to attempt to reduce
fluctuations in the unemployment
rate. However, the two insurance
programs provide partial, not com-
plete, protection. The federal guaran-
tee of bank deposits protects each
individual account up to $100,000, so
large accounts are not fully protected.
Most state unemployment insurance
programs replace somewhere between
one-half to two-thirds of a worker’s
most recent weekly pay, but only for a
maximum of 28 weeks. Because both
deposit and unemployment insurance
are not complete, the possibility
remains that a large enough increase in
the unemployment rate may lead to
enough of an increase in the desire to
self-insure so as to destabilize the
economy.
That stabilization policies
exist to protect against instability
should not come as a surprise. What is
somewhat odd is that mainstream
macroeconomics does not really accept
the point that stabilization policies are
necessary to prevent instability. The
mainstream view is that market
economies are self-regulating: if a
shock moves the unemployment rate
away from the natural rate, market
forces eventually bring the unemploy-
ment rate back to the natural rate.
The cycle of rising unemployment,
more hoarding, and more unemploy-
ment that I highlighted earlier is
assumed to be impossible.14 But there
is no theoretical presumption that
market economies are necessarily self-
regulating. It’s possible to construct
macroeconomic models in which the
forces of self-regulation are weak
enough that adverse shocks precipitate
economic crises.15  Whether the forces
suggests that if counter-cyclical policy
eliminates even a very small likelihood
of a Great Depression-like event, the
resulting gain in living standards can
be quite significant. We estimate that a
person would pay as much as $1,380
per year to eliminate a once-in-83-
years chance of living through a
Depression-like event.16  Thus, if
countercyclical monetary policy does
nothing other than prevent economic
crises, that benefit alone may provide
an adequate justification for pursuing
it.
14 The textbook New Keynesian or IS-LM
model does not allow for the possibility of
economic crises. While a decline in aggregate
demand may cause a temporary rise in
unemployment, the model predicts that market
forces (in the absence of any further shocks to
aggregate demand) will eventually bring the
unemployment rate back to the natural rate.
15 MIT professor Peter Diamond demonstrated
this possibility in a series of influential articles in
the early 1980s. His views are summarized in his
1982 book.
By attempting to reduce the volatility of the
unemployment rate, countercyclical monetary
policy makes it less likely that households will
face a large simultaneous increase in the
probability of job loss.
of self-regulation can be relied on to
avoid crises in actual economies is a
controversial issue.
If the true benefit of counter-
cyclical monetary policy lies in
preventing economic crises, how much
of an effect does it have on living
standards? The answer depends on
how likely it is that economic crises
will occur in the absence of counter-
cyclical monetary policy. Although
there is no accepted estimate of that
likelihood, some of my research
SUMMARY
Macroeconomists typically
view reducing the cyclical volatility of
the unemployment and inflation rates
as the proper goal of countercyclical
monetary policy. Generally speaking,
macroeconomists and policymakers
have not been very explicit about why
such reductions enhance well-being.
This article discussed some research
that bears on this question. In particu-
lar, it laid out the implications of the
view that the benefits of
countercyclical monetary policy
ultimately derive from the effect such
a policy has on people’s standard of
living.
The standard-of-living
criterion has unexpected implications
for assessing the benefits of counter-
cyclical monetary policy. If the goal of
countercyclical monetary policy is to
reduce volatility in the standard of
living, such a policy is unlikely to be
16 See my working paper with Dean Corbae for
details.14   Q2 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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very beneficial. The problem is that if
monetary authorities succeed in
reducing the volatility of the unem-
ployment and inflation rates, this
success will partly substitute for private
actions taken to safeguard living
standards (self-insurance). Thus,
because of self-insurance, the overall
reduction in the volatility of the
standard of living will not be as great
as one might otherwise suppose.
On the other hand, self-
insurance may be a mixed blessing.
Sudden increases in the desire to self-
insure can be a source of macroeco-
nomic instability. Taking this possibility
into account suggests that an impor-
tant benefit of countercyclical mon-
etary policy (along with deposit and
unemployment insurance) is to reduce
the likelihood of a sudden upward jump
in the unemployment rate. Such a jump
could trigger a destabilizing rise in the
desire to self-insure and cause an
economic crisis. If countercyclical
monetary policy eliminates even a
small likelihood of economic crisis, the
gain in the average person’s living
standard may be large enough to justify
the potential costs of such a policy.